I guess I'll start the party rolling ...

One of the key deficiencies, I see in hazard analysis, is that those conducting the assessment frequently have become so familiar with the tasks that they are assessing that they no longer percieve the risks. Recent analysis, by the Company that I work for, shows that whilst the highest number of employees involved in injuy incidnets are those who have been with the Company for more than ten years, Employees with the Company for less than a year are 3 times more likely to be involved in an incident.

What initiatives have members been involved in or actions have you taken to improve risk perception not only in those becoming too familiar with the tasks but also with new employees, maybe not as familiar with the tasks being performed?

Nice post. I agree with you. If you want to see a JHA site in action check out jobhazardanalysis.ning.com

This is a new site where we are trying to promote the use of the JHA. You will find a new innovate approach. This site is being developed based on the book,

Job Hazard Analysis: A guide for voluntary compliance and beyond. This is the summary of the book as posted on Amazon. 5 reviews have been written.

• Provides the tools to rebuild or enhance a desired safety culture.
• Allows you to identify a program that will fit your specific application.
• Examines different philosophies in relation to safety culture development.

Learn how to develop and use Job Hazard Analysis as the underlying method for your safety program. A Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) identifies the basic job steps and tasks and their associated hazards and risks, and then develop s safe operating procedures and hazard controls based on this analysis. In this book, James Roughton and Nathan Crutchfield argue that the JHA should be the centerpiece of any risk control and occupational safety and health program and a methodical analysis is required for the new American safety and health management standard ANSI/AIHA Z10. However, the traditional JHA has potential problems in gathering and analysis of task data and, with its focus on the sequence of steps, can miss the behavioral effects and the systems interactions between tools, equipment, materials, work environment, management and the individual worker. The authors present a new and improved concept for the JHA incorporating elements from Behavior-Based Safety and Six Sigma. They take the reader through the whole process of developing tools for identifying workplace hazards, developing systems that support hazard recognition, developing an effective JHA, and managing a JHA based program and fitting it into occupational safety and health management systems, allowing businesses to move from mere compliance to a pro-active safety management. The book is supported by numerous examples of JHAs, end of chapter review questions, sample checklists, action plans and forms.

• Enhances the JHA with concepts from Behavior- Related Safety and proven risk assessment strategies using Six Sigma tools
• Methodically develops the risk assessment basis needed for ANSI/AIHA Z10 and other safety and health management systems
• Includes numerous real-life examples, end of chapter review questions, sample checklists, action plans and forms
• Complete online solutions manual for instructors adopting the book in college and university occupational safety and health courses.

To view video clips stop youtube.

You comments are welcome.

I have found that how management thinks a job is being done and how it actually is done can be widely apart. Over time, the actual way the job and its subtasks are done gradually change and much of what is done goes into habit or rote.   If OJT is used, additional variation will be present.  

We've found that using the cause and effect diagram can bring out the complexity of a job and allows an indepth discussion on how all its pieces fit together.  The site James references has a PDF of the way we suggest the "Fishbone" be laid out to gather information.   Our book also provides ideas on estalishing a JHA process beyond just one-off reviews.

I lead client workshops that bring in line supervison, safety committee members, etc.   I go through a process where we identify jobs that have a high risk, caused  damage or injury or are of concern.  The group rank orders them by severity and frequency of exposure (they know the jobs through experience and the safety data adds insight).  I give a briefing on how to do the cause and effect diagram (fishbone) using the specific layout, about 20 minutes.   We break into teams and begin to analyse the high priority jobs.   (I've seen very artistic and detailed diagrams completed by people who were thought not to have the skills or ability to do such reviews.  Really good work!)   We then discuss each diagram for hazards, risk changes, etc using the Hiearchy of Controls.

At every session I've held, I see and hear indepth discussions about not just hazards that were hidden but each group struggles to define the steps of the job and its sub tasks!  The job is getting completed but a wide range of subdetails, shortcuts, oversights and issues are brought to light.
The method can really get past that myopia and acceptance of risk and hazards that are being worked around.  The proces gets a real dialog going.   

It then becomes a case of now that we know, what do we do?    Hence the next step of devising a full JHA and on to the SOP. 

Something that I noticed was that we would perform a risk analysis and create a SOP (Safe Operating Practice) to address the risks. I would train the employees involved in how to perform their job safely. Unfortunately, the next person who transferred onto the job would be first taught by operations how to do the job "properly" then I would be called to teach them to do it safely. Since the Standard Operating Practices, also referred to as SOPs, came from divisional headquarters and the Safe Operating Practices came from the plant, it was impossible to get them integrated into a Safe Standard Operating Procedure.

Gary's comment about the injury rate among more senior employees is well known in my company as well. Specifically, it was the Skilled Tradesmen who became blind to the risks inherent in their jobs. The majority of fatalities in my industry involved tradesmen with more than 25 years seniority. It's the little shortcuts that, over time, became the unofficial way to do the job.